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RALPH D, SLATER, dba INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLISHERS 
SERVICE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, and L. C. CROW-
THER, as Chief of Police of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 
Respondents. 
Appellant's 
Brief 
Case No. 7222 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from the order of the district court 
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action{Tr. 23) following the election of appellant to 
stand on his COII;lplaint upon sustaining of a demurrer 
thereto. The demurrer (Tr. 18) was based on a failure 
to state a cause of action or state a case for injunctive 
ll relief. The order sustaining the demurrer (Tr. 23) 
:: J denied the right to amend the complaint and ordered a 
!! dismissal thereof, thus indicating that the ruling of the : t court was for failure to state a cause of action for any 
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2 
relief whatever. It will therefore be assumed that the 
ruling of the court was that the complaint stated grounds 
for equitable relief but that it failed to state a cause of 
action entitling appellant to any relief whatever. 
Since the appeal is on the judgment roll there is 
no transcript of evidence. There is, however, a memo-
randum decision (Tr. 20-22) stating the court's reasons 
for sustaining the demurrer of the respondent. The com-
plaint alleges that the action of respondents is violative 
of appellants rights of freedom of speech and press, the 
right to engage in interstate commerce without inter-
ference, that it deprives appellant of his business with-
out due process of law, and of the equal protection of 
the laws, and that the ordinance by which respondents 
justify their action is discriminatory and unconstitu-
tional. 
There follows the complaint, without the title and 
verification ( Tr. 1-8) : 
Plaintiff complains of defendant·s and for cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
1. That at all times mentioned herein plaintiff, 
Ralph Slater, was doing business as the International 
Publishers Service, and as such engaged in business in 
the state of Utah and elsewhere. Plaintiff a's such has 
filed heretofore with the County Clerk of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, an affidavit of assumed named 
in the manner required by Section 58-2-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. 
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Plaintiff now is and for many years has been 
a broker representing various national magazine dis-
tributors and publishers, and he is, and at all times 
mentioned herein, was. thoroughly qualified personally, 
and through agents and employees, to contract and sell 
subscriptions to. and to sell, magazines such as INTER-
:JIOFXT~-\.I~ SPORTS~IAN. GOLFER AND SPORTS-
M.-\.X, DIXE .-\.~D DANCE, and many other and various 
publications. 
3. It is the business custom of plaintiff to obtain 
and send agents into all the ~states of the Union, solicit-
ing and obtaining subscriptions to the publications in 
paragraph 2 hereof mentioned. For over a year last 
past, plaintiff doing business as International Publishers 
Service, has had permanent headquarters in Los Angeles, 
California. 
4. For one and one-half years last past, and ;par-
ticularly for five weeks last past plaintiff has conducted 
his said business using the methods described in this 
complaint, and at intervals since 1947 has so conducted 
said business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff is will-
ing to pay any la~ful license fees, and to abide by any 
lawful regulations, so as to do business in Salt Lake 
City. Plaintiff is protected against derilictions of plain-
tiff's agents and employees by bonds of the WILLIAM 
J. BURNS INTERNATIONAL DETECTIVE 
AGENCY. It has alwaY's been and will be the policy 
of plaintiff to make every effort to assure that the soli-
citations of magazine subscriptions to the publications 
aforesaid are conducted in a quiet, fair and lawful 
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manner; and that subscribers are accepted only in the 
event they give a definite place of address; and that 
said ~subscribers receive that which they contract and 
pay to receive. 
5. Defendant Salt Lake City now is, and at all 
times mentioned herein was, a municipal co~poration 
within the State of Utah, and as such duly organized 
and incorporated pursuant to the laws of said State of 
Utah. 
6. Defendant L. C. Crowther, now is, and at all 
times mentioned herein was, Chief of Police of said 
Salt Lake City; and as such he now is, and at all time's 
mentioned herein was, charged with the enforcement, 
in said City of the ordinances hereinafter mentioned. 
7. The Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 
passed and enacted an ordinance known as Section 3652 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, parts 
of which read as follows : 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to 
peddle or offer for sale, barter or exchange at 
retail, any garden or farm produce, fruits, butter, 
eggs, poultry, fish, game, or any other goods, 
wares or merchandise whatsoever, or any tickets, 
coupons or receipts representing value or re-
deemable in service, photographs, works of art, 
magazine subscriptions, goods or merchandise 
whatsoever, in upon or along any street of Salt 
Lake City without first obtaining a license so 
to do. 
"It shall be unlawful for any ;p,erson, under 
any circumstances, to peddle, sell or offer for 
'Sale any magazine subscriptions, goods, wares 
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or n1erchandise whatsoever, in upon or along 
any of the following streets, to-wit: 
''South Temple street from Second East 
street to First 'Yest street: First South street 
from Second East street to First West street; 
Second South street from Second Enst street to 
First \Y est street; Third South street from Sec-
ond East street to First 'Vest street; Fourth 
South street from Second East street to First 
'Yest street; State street from First North street 
to Fifth South street; Main street from First 
X orth street to Fifth South street; and no license 
shall be granted to any person to peddle in upon 
or along the said streets above described ... , ". 
Violations of said ordinances are made punishable 
by arrest and imprisonment, under provisions of Section 
3718 of the said Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
8. Plaintiff now is and has been, engaged on the 
public street's and sidewalks in said Salt Lake City, and 
in areas, doorways and entranceways immediately abut-
ting thereon, in the business of soliciting and selling, 
in a quiet, dignified and peaceful manner, without pres-
sure or undue influence, by and through agents and 
employees employed by him for the purpose of selling, 
to persons on said places, subscriptions to the maga-
zines and periodicals aforesaid, for future delivery, and 
likewise the sale of tangible personal property to be 
delivered to the purchasers thereof, or to some other 
person, at a subsequent time. Some of the said subscrip-
tions were and will be sent to other states and were and 
will be filled by sending into Utah the publications which 
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6 
are published in other states. Some of the other sub-
scriptions were and will be filled by sending into other 
states the publications which are published in Utah. 
The methods of street ~solicitation by ~~laintiff, his 
agents and employees, described in this complaint, and 
especially as described in this ;paragraph 8 hereof, now 
are, and at all the times mentioned in this complaint 
were, the major source and the main manner of selling 
the property and obtaining subscriptions to the publica-
tions mentioned in this complaint, including, among 
other, the property and publications mentioned in par-
agraphs 2 and 3 of this complaint. The said methods 
of street solicitation now are, and at all the times men-
tioned in this complaint were, by far, the most effective 
method; and, in a great many cases, the only possible 
methods of selling said property and obtaining said 
subscriptions. 
9. At ~sundry and various times, while plaintiff 
was peaceably so engaged in carrying on said business, 
by and through his agents and employees, in said Salt 
Lake City, the defendants herein, acting by and through 
police officers of the defendant municipality, and for 
the purpose of 1preventing plaintiff from so soliciting, 
by and through his agents and employees, sales of such 
subscriptions and sales of such tangible personal prop-
erty, arrested certain of plaintiff's said agents and em-
ployees for alleged violations of said ordinance, and 
ordered other of plaintiff's ~said agents and employees 
not to make said sales, and threatened to make further 
arrests of them, and to prosecute all said agents and 
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7 
employees for alleged violations of said ordinance, there-
by preventing and threatening to continue to prevent, 
plaintiff from rarrying on in the manner aforesaid his 
said business in said Salt Lake City, all to :plaintiff'~s 
great pecuniary damage and irreparable loss. And 
plaintiff avers and charges that said arrests, and said 
orders and said threats of further arrests and prosecu-
tions. were made for the purpose of hindering, haras-
sing, impeding, delaying and frustrating, and did hinder, 
harass, impede, delay and frustrate the efforts and at-
tempts of plaintiff and his said agents and employees, 
in carrying on and conducting plaintiff's said business 
in said Salt Lake City; and plaintiff charges and avers 
that said arrests, and threatened arrests, and prosecu-
tions, were made by defendants for the purpose of com-
.pelling plaintiff, and did compel plaintiff, to stop and 
abandon the further operation of his said business within 
the above described portions of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
10. Plaintiff is advised by his counsel, and now 
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid 
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are, 
and will be, violative of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I 
of the Constitution of Utah, and of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, in that, said ordinance, not being regulatory, 
is arbitrary and oppressive, and is an outright prohibi-
tion of lawful business and of the right of plaintiff to 
engage in a lawful business. 
11. By their said acts, the defendants, in violation 
of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I of the Constitution 
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8 
of Utah, and of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, have denied 
to plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws in the 
manner following, to-wit: 
(1) Many persons other than plaintiff and other 
than plaintiff's agents and employees have, on numer-
ous occasions, violated with impunity the provisions of 
said ordinance in that they have on the public streets 
and sidewalks of ~said City, doorways and entranceways 
immediately abutting thereon, solicited, and are con-
tinuing to solicit, the sale, to persons on said 1places of 
subscriptions to magazines and periodicals for future 
delivery, goods, wares and merchandise, and have sold, 
and are continuing to sell, to persons on such places 
tangible personal property, goods, wares and merchan-
dise. 
Among the magazines, periodicals , and tangible 
personal property so sold and 'SO solicited for sale by 
such other persons are the following: 
(a) Magazines known as ''Consolation" and 
"Watchtower", ;published and circulated by a cult known 
known as ''Jehovah's Witnesses''; 
(b) Coupons entitling persons of whom a photo-
graph had been taken, to have delivered to him or her, 
as the case may be, the photograph of himself or her-
self, as the case may be ; 
(c) Coupons entitling purchasers to sightseeing 
tours of Salt Lake City and other places in the state 
of Utah. 
None of said other persons who have so violated 
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9 
the provisions of said ordinance have ever been arrested 
or prosecuted, or in anywise molested by defendants, 
or by either of then1, or by any of the agents or repre-
sentatiYes of defendants, or of either defendant, or by 
any of the police officers of said Salt Lake City. 
(3) Defendants, their agents and representatives, 
and police officers of said Salt Lake City who act under 
the authority of said defendant Chief of Police, have 
at all times had notice and knowledge of said violations 
of said ordinance by said third parties as aforesaid, 
and, possessing such notice and knowledge, defendants, 
their agents and representatives, and said police of-
ficers, with intent to discriminate against plaintiffs and 
plaintiff's said business, have at all times deliberately 
refrained from enforcing said ordinance as against said 
third party violators thereof. 
12. Plaintiff is advised by his counsel, and now 
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid 
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are, 
and will be violative of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah and of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States in that said ordinance bars, in the manner alleged, 
the distribution and dissemination of said publications 
and thereby prevents the exercise by the publishers and 
plaintiff of their constitutional rights of the freedom 
of press and the freedom of speech. 
13. Plain tiff is advised by his counsel, and now 
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid 
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are, 
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10 
and will be, violative of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and of the 
''Equal protection clause'' of Section I of said Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States in that, without any reasonable basis therefor, 
said ordinance, which when read together with Section 
3647 of the s~id Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, excluding "newspaper" boys from the class identi-
fied as "hawkers", makes an arbitrary classification 
as between that class of persons who solicit the sale 
of s:ubscriptions and tangible personal property and 
that class of persons who solicit the sale of newspapers, 
thereby arbitrarily discriminating in favor of those who 
sell newspapers and against those who sell magazines, 
with the result that there is granted to the class which 
sells newspapers a privilege from which those who sell 
magazines,are arbitrarily excluded. 
14. Plaintiff is advised by his counsel, and now 
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid 
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are, 
and will be, violative of the ''commerce clause'' of 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United 
States, in that said acts do, and will, materially burden 
and interfere with the free flow of legitimate interstate 
commerce, by preventing plaintiff from obtaining sub-
scriptions for magazines to be sent from other states 
and from being filled by sending into Utah the publica-
tions which are published in the other states, and by 
preventing plaintiff from obtaining other of said sub-
scriptions for magazines to be sent to other states and 
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11 
from being filled by sending into the other states the 
publications which are published in Utah. 
15. Plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate rem-
edy at law and he files this, his complaint, as a complaint 
and affidavit for the purpose of securing a temporary 
restraining order and temporary and permanent in-
junction against the defendants. The defendants will, 
unless restrained by this court, enforce the said ordi-
nance against :plaintiff and his said agents and repre-
sentatives and will thereby injure and destroy the plain-
tiff's said property and property rights, and cause them 
material and irreparable loss, and plaintiff will be un-
able to conduct their said business in Salt Lake City. 
The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest 
and costs, many thousands of dollars. The value of the 
right of plaintiff to carry on his said business, free 
from the harrassing and unlawful acts threatened by 
defendants as alleged hereinbefore, exceeds many thou-
sands of dollars. Moreover, unless defendants be re-
strained from committing the acts which they are threat-
ening to commit, as alleged hereinbefore, there is im-
minent danger that said agents and representatives will 
leave the service of plaintiff and plaintiff will be unable 
to obtain replacements, for fear of and in distress over 
said acts of defendants, and plaintiff's said business in 
Salt Lake City, which is and has been over a long period 
of time a very substantial portion of plaintiff's total 
business, will be totally destroyed, all to ~Jaintiff's 
great and irreparable injury and damage. Plaintiff 
avers that the relief requested herein is absolutely nee-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
essary for the protection of plaintiffs, his agents and 
representatives, against the wanton further molesta-
tion by the said defendants. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays: 
1. That an order issue out of this court, enjoining 
and restraining the defendants, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees and attorneys, from interfering 
with or molesting plaintiff, his agents, representatives 
in connection with the soliciting by them, or by any of 
them, of the sales of subscriptions to magazines or 
periodicals for future delivery, or the sales by them, or 
by any of them, of any tangible personal property to 
be delivered at a subsequent time or immediately. 
2. For a preliminary and final injunction, enjoin-
ing and restraining defendants, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees and attorneys, from interfering with 
or molesting, plaintiff, his agents, servants and em-
ployees in connection with the soliciting by them, or by 
any of them, of the sales of subscriptions to magazines 
or periodicals or the sales by them or any of them, of 
any tangible personal property to be delivered immedi-
ately or at a subsequent time. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court 
may deem just and proper. 
ROBERT S. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
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STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S CASE 
Section 3652 of the ReYised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, 1944, provides that peddlers of certain articles 
must obtain licenses before selling or offering to sell 
their wares in the city of Salt Lake. It also provides 
that peddlers of some of those articles may not sell or 
offer to sell their articles at all within a certain defined 
business district of the city. The general provision re-
quiring licenses covers those who sell any tickets, cou-
pons or receipts representing value or redeemable in 
service, photographs, works of art, magazine subscrip-
tions and any goods, wares and merchandise. The latter 
provision prohibits in the business district the sale only 
of magazine subscriptions and goods, wares and mer-
chandise. Appellant's contention at the outset is that 
it is unconstitutional for the city to attempt to prohibit 
conversations on the public streets notwithstanding 
those conversations partake of a business nature, for 
the reason that it is a denial of the right of free speech, 
and that forbidding the sale of magazine subscriptions 
is not only a denial of the freedom of speech and press, 
but also an interference with interstate commerce, in-
asmuch as the magazines are to be shipped either from 
without the state of Utah to purchasers in the state or 
from the state of Utah to purchasers outside of Utah. 
If this section is justified it must be for the reason 
that it is a reasonable prohibition for the purpose of 
promoting the health, safety, comfort, morals or gen-
eral welfare of the public. The only purpose, conceiv-
able to appellant, for which the prohibition in this sec-
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tion was adopted is to promote the general welfare by 
assuring the free flow of pedestrian traffic on the side-
walks of the business district. Appellant concedes that 
the erection of a stand on the public sidewalk or the 
stopping of a cart from which articles are sold or dis-
tributed would be an interference with traffic, which 
may be :prohibited to promote the general welfare. But 
appellant contends that it is not necessary to the free 
flow of traffic to prohibit the activities of moving ped-
dlers regardless of what they are selling; that it is not 
of sufficient importance to the general welfare of the 
public to restrict certain citizens in their freedom of 
speech and press, and to interfere with interstate com-
merce. 
Further, appellant contends that as the sections of 
the ordinances appear on their face there is an unrea-
sonable discrimination in the differentiation between 
solicitatio~ of magazine subscriptions and the sale of 
newspapers, tickets, coupons and receipts. The differ-
entiation bears no reasonable relation to the problem 
of traffic control. 
Should the court hold that the ordinance on its face 
is valid for the reason that the intention of the Board 
of Commissioners in adopting said ordinance was to 
prohibit peddling of any kind whatsover on the streets 
of the business district, then appellant contends that 
the intentional discrimination in the enforcement of the 
ordinance on the part of respondents against appellant, 
his agents, re,presentatives and employees, in favor of 
salesmen of tickets for sightseeing tours, photograph 
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coupons, receipts, ice rremn, ''poppies,''· rodeo tickets, 
etc., is unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection 
of the law, and should be enjoined. 
This argument is advanced under four points. 
POINTS OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
I. Section 3652, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, 1944, is an infringement of the inherent and inalien-
able right to communicate freely thoughts and opinions 
and abridges and restrains the freedom of speech and of 
the press. 
II. Section 3652, supra, is a burden upon interstate 
commerce in contravention of the Constitution in that 
it prohibits the free flow of goods between the states 
and limits the area within which goods may flow. 
III. Section 3652, supra, is void because it is arbi-
trary, capricious, and not supported by any reason, logic, 
lawful classification or legitimate objective. 
IV. Assuming that Section 3652, supra, is valid on 
its face. then the discriminatory enforcement of the 
ordinance is unlawful and should be enjoined. 
I. Section 3652, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
1944, is an infringment of the inherent and inalienable 
right to communicate freely thoughts and opinions and 
abridges and restrains the freedom of speech and of the 
press. 
Amendment I to the Constitution of the United 
States provides: 
''Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." 
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The freedom of speech and of the press secured 
by the First Amendment against abridgment by the 
United States is similarly secured to all persons by the 
Fourteenth against abridgment by a state. Schneider 
v. State (1939), 308 U. S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 144, 60 S. Ct. 
146; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652; Whitney v. 
California, 27 4 U. S. 357; Stromberg v. California, 283 
U. S. 359; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 
233; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353; Herndon v. 
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444. 
Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
''All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; 
to acquire, possess and protect property; to wor-
ship according to the dictates of their conscien-
ces; to assemble peaceably, protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances ; 
to communicate freely their thoughts and o:p.i-
nions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right." 
Article I, Section 15, provides, inter alia : 
''No law shall be passed to abridge or re-
strain the freedom of speech or of the press ... '' 
The inherent and inalienable right to enjoy free-
dom of s.peech and freedom of the press have been 
'secured by the constitutions of the United States and 
of the State of Utah. 
One of the questions posed by this case is, have the 
rights secured by the constitution been abridged by this 
ordinance? 
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.A n1unicipality may enact regulations in the inter-
est of the morals, public safety, health, welfare or con-
venience, however, these may not abridge the individ-
ual liberties secured by the Constitutions to those who 
wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or 
opinion. Municipal authorities have the duty to keep 
their communities' streets open and available for move-
ment of people and property, the primary pur:pose to 
which the streets are dedicated. Schneider v. State, 
supra. 
Freedom of speech and that of the press are funda-
mental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not 
an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the 
belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise 
of the rights lies at the foundation of free government 
of free men. It stresses the importance of preventing 
the restrictions of the enjoyment of these liberties. 
Where legislative abridgment of these rights is 
asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the ef-
fect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative pref-
erences or beliefs respecting matters of public conven-
ience may well support regulation directed at other per-
sonal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as 
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the main-
tenance of democratic institutions. To the courts is 
assigned the difficult task to weigh the circumstances 
and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons ad-
vanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoy-
ment of the rights. Schneider v. State, supra. 
A municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution, 
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without a permit, of ''circulars, handbooks, advertising, 
or literature of any kind, whether said articles are 
being delivered free, or whether same are being sold,'' 
was held to be invalid on its face, as infringing the 
constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press. Lovell 
v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949. In that case Mr. 
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, stated: 
''Freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press, which are protected by the First Amend-
ment from infringment by Congress, are among 
the fundamental personal rights and liberties 
which are protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment from invasion by state action ... It is also 
well settled that municipal ordinances adopted 
under state authority constitute state action and 
are within the prohibition of the amendment ... 
The ordinance is not limited to 'literature' that 
is obscene or offensive to public morals or that 
advocates unlawful conduct ... The ordinance 
embraces 'literature' in the widest sense. The 
ordinance is comprehensive with respect to the 
method of distribution. It covers every sort of 
circulation, 'either by hand or otherwise.' There 
is thus no restriction in its application with re-
spect to time or place. It is not limited to ways 
which might be regarded as inconsistent with the 
maintenance of public order, or as involving dis-
orderly conduct, the molestation of the inhabi-
tants, or the misuse or littering of the streets. 
The ordinance prohibits the distribution of litera-
ture of any kind at any time, at any place, and 
in any manner without a permit from the city 
manager . . Whatever the motive which induced 
its adoption, its character is such that it strikes 
at the very foundation of the freedom of the 
press by subjecting it to license and censorship. 
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·'The liberty of the press is not confined 
to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily 
embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . The ;press in 
its historic connotation comprehends every sort 
of publication which affords a vehicle of infor-
mation and opinion. 
"The ordinance cannot be saved because it 
relates to distribution and not to publication. 
Liberty of circulating is as essential to that free-
dom as liberty of publishing;'' 
The nature of the matter, so long as it be not objec-
tionable upon fundamental grounds, makes little or no 
difference as it is obvious that the effect of the distri-
bution of handbills, dodgers, newspapers or magazines 
on the streets will be substantially the same whether 
they contain printed matter of a commercial nature or 
political or religious matter. Schneider v. State, supra. 
See also Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, in the 
case of Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E., 2d 905, 
in attempting to sustain an ordinance prohibiting the 
sale of magazines within the loop district, stated that 
because Rhine was "carrying out a private commercial 
enterprise for personal profit; and that the ordinance 
was limited to the congested part of the city and was 
general in character'' the ordinance might be sustained. 
Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Supreme 
Court of the United States, save Mr. Justice Reynolds, 
stated: 
''The streets are natural and proper places 
for the dissemination of information and opinion; 
and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty 
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of expression in appropriate :places abridged on 
the plea that it may be exercised in some other 
place.'' 
The same Illinois Supreme Court held that a city 
has no authority to require book canvassers who solicit 
subscriptions for books for future delivery to obtain a 
license, since such canvassers are neither hawkers nor 
peddlers. Emmons v. City of Lewiston, 132 Ill. 380, 
24 N. E. 58; and see Village of Ceno Gorch v. Rawlings, 
135 Ill. 36, 25 N. E. 1006. 
The rights granted by the constitution not only 
guarantee the right of speech and to write, but also to 
make known that which is not limited to a person's own 
writing. South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 26 N. E. 
2d 868. 
In the case of McKay Jewelers v. Bowron (1942), 
19 Cal. 2d 595; 122 P. 2d 543, the California Supreme 
Court found an ordinance prohibiting solicitations from 
doorways and entrance ways of passersby on the street 
unconstitutional as not necessary to the general welfare 
with the comment that it is conceivable that some hyper-
sensitive individuals may find this type of solicitation 
offensive but that it is not sufficient to justify the pro-
·hibition of an otherwise lawful method of conducting 
a business. 
The right to conduct a private business free from 
unreasonable regulation is just as sacred as the right 
of the members of a labor organization to conduct a 
campaign for better labor conditions, and should receive 
equal protection under the constitutional guarantees. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
To permit peaceful solicitation by a picket on the side-
walk and prohibit 1p€aceful solicitation from a doorway 
abutting on the sidewalk would be gross discrimination. 
In summation, it might be stated, that the basis for 
the ordinance might be for the morals, health, safety, 
convenience, or general welfare of the public. No con-
tention is made that such sales of subscriptions to mag-
azines have any relation to the health or morals of the 
community. As to the safety, the courts have found 
that if the purpose be to prevent fraud by taking pay-
ment in advance, other methods of protection are avail-
able to the city fathers and the infringements upon 
these sacred constitutional rights should not be so 
abridged. Schneider v. State, supra. If the purpose 
be to prevent the littering of the streets, such a situation 
may be avoided by means other than this infringement. 
In the cited case, the court stated that "the public 
convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does 
not justify an exertion of the police ;power which in-
vades the free communication of information and opin-
ion secured by the Constitution.'' See Hague v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 83 
L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954. The case of McKay Jewelers 
v. Bowron, supra, states specifically that the fact one 
might not desire to be solicited on the streets did not 
provide a constitutional basis for an ordinance pro-
hibiting the same and that solicitations on the streets 
are sanctioned and recognized by the courts. There is 
no evidence in the case at bar that the streets are con-
gested and warrant such legislation and the complaint 
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specifically alleges that traffic 1s not hindered in its 
free flow. The instant case forms no basis for the in-
fringement of the constitutional rights of appellant so 
as to deprive him and his agents, employees and rep-
resentatives of freedom of speech and of the press. 
''Ordinances absolutely prohibiting the exer-
cise of the rights to disseminate information are, 
a fortiori, invalid.'' Jones v. Opelika, Bowden 
v. Fort Smith, Jobin v. Arizona, 316 U. S. 584. 
II. Section 3652, supra, is a burden upon interstate 
commerce in contravention of the Constitution in that it 
prohibits the free flow of goods between the states and 
limits the area within which goods may flow. 
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the 
United States provides, inter alia: 
''The Congress shall have Power to lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common De-
fence and general welfare of the United States; 
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States: ... " 
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes ; ... '' 
The articles, namely magazines, being sold are :pub-
lications originating outside of the State of Utah in 
the main. The publications are being sold by agents 
from outside the State of Utah. The appellant 
is not a resident of the State of Utah. The orders ob-
tained are sent outside the State of Utah for fulfillment. 
The articles purchased are mailed into the State of Utah 
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to the purchasers. There is no contention that the busi-
ness is in any manner not a legitin1ate business eon-
ducted in accordance with proper morals and ethics. 
~-\..n ordinance of Alexandria, Louisiana, provided 
that a canvasser n1ust be licensed to solicit sales within 
the city. Agents of the Pictorial Review Company were 
arrested because they had failed to obtain a license 
prior to soliciting magazine subscriptions in the city. 
In pictorial Review Co. v. City of Alexandria, (1930) 
46 Fed. 2d 337, the Federal District Court held that: 
''Although the city undoubtedly had the 
right to protect citizens from imposition by ;per-
sons who might violate its police regulations in-
tended for protection of property, morals, health, 
and safety, where the nature of business was in-
herently dangerous, it was established that the 
business, being that of publishing of magazines 
for which subscriptions were taken, was harmless 
and legitimate traffic in interstate commerce.'' 
The city of Portland, Oregon, enacted an ordinance 
requiring the purchase of a license and payment of a 
fee therefor by peddlers or solicitors canvassing from 
door to door. Hosiery salesmen were selling hose for 
future delivery and collecting a down payment. After 
the payment was made the order was sent to the home 
office. The corporation was an Illinois corporation. The 
hosiery were manufactured in Indiana. The home of-
fice· shipped the hosiery to the purchaser C. 0. D. on the 
balance due. The Supreme Court of the United States 
determined, upon the constitutionality of the ordinance 
being challenged, that : 
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"The ordinance materially burdens inter-
state commerce and conflicts with the Commerce 
clause.'' Real Silk Hosiery Mills. v. City of Port-
land etal, 268 U. S. 315. 
A city ordinance prohibited solicitors, peddlers and 
agents going to houses having the sign "No peddlers" 
upon them in order to make sales. Salesmen for Real 
Silk Hosiery Mills, operating as set forth in the previous 
paragraph in the city of Richmond, California, were 
charged with violating said ordinance. The United 
States District Court found that the ordinance was a 
'burden upon the interstate commerce as it enlarged the 
group of individuals who were prohibited from ap-
proaching such houses to more than peddlers. Real 
Silk Hosiery Mills v. Richmond, California, 298 Fed. 
126. See Nippert v. Richmond, 90 L. Ed, 496, 66 S. 
Ct. 586. 
In the case at bar, the agent is prohibited from 
soliciting business within a large section of the city 
by this ordinance and therefore such restriction limits 
the free flow of business between the states and that 
.area and is a burden upon interstate commerce. 
III. Section 3652, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, 1944, is void because it is arbitrary capricious, and 
not supported by any reason, logic, lawful classification or 
legitimate objective. 
The complaint alleges that Section 3652, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944, particularly when 
read together with Section 3647 thereof, makes an ab-
bitrary classification as between that class of persons 
who solicit the sale of magazine subscriptions, 
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goods, wares and merchandise and that class of persons 
w·ho solicit the sale of newspapers. In defining Hawkers, 
Section 3647 provides that any person selling or offer-
ing for sale any article or thing, except newspapers 
upon any open or public ground shall be deemed a 
hawker. Section 3652 under which appellant, his agents, 
representatives and employees were arrested and pro-
secuted provides that it shall be unlawful for any per-
son under any circumstances, to peddle, sell or offer 
for sale any magazine subscriptions, goods, wares or 
merchandise whatsover on the streets of the defined 
business district. This arbitrary classification, it is 
submitted, is repugnant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
which provides as follows: 
"No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or pro-
perty, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within the jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.'' 
and it is also violative of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah, Section 24, Article 1, which requires that 
"All lawS'· of a general nature shall have uni-
form operation." · 
Laws and ordinances of a general nature, which 
limit and restirct the liberty of citizens, may be en-
forced if they are reasonably necessary for the pro-
tion, safety, health, morals, comfort or general wel-
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fare of the general public. The public power of a 
state or municipality, however, must not be exercised 
in such a manner as to operate without equal force upon 
citizens of the same class. Classification of citizens must 
be based upon some real differentiation, and the dif-
ferentiation must bear resonable relation to the pur-
pose of the law or ordinance. 
At the outset it must be determined for what pur-
pose the city fathers saw fit to prohibit sales of mag-
azine subscriptions in the business district of the city. 
The purposes for which the ordinance could possibly 
have been adopted are five fold, and will be consid-
ered in turn. 
(1) To guard against the possibility of fraud 
arising out of 1paying for a subscription to magazines 
for future delivery. Had this been the intention of the 
city fathers, it seems that the prohibition would have 
been general and not limited to street- solicitation in 
'the business district, and the ban would not have ex-
tended to ''goods, wares and merchandise'' which can 
he delivered right on the street at the time of the sale. 
Suppose the ordinance had been general in that it pro-
hibited the sale of magazine subscriptions any place in 
the city, and suppose it only covered sales of orders 
for future delivery, is the possibility of fraud suffi-
cient reason for such a prohibition 1 Tiedman on Limi-
tation of Police Power, at page 293, has expressed him-
self on the allied problem of suppression of the ticket 
brokerage business as follows : 
"It is not contended that the business of 
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ticket brokerage is in itself of a fraudlent charac-
ter. The business can be honestly conducted by 
honest men. It is only claimed that in its prose-
cution the business presents manifold opportuni-
ties for the commission of fraud. If that were 
a justifiable ground for abolishing any business, 
many important, perhaps some of the most bene-
ficial employments and professions could be 
properly prohibited. There is no profession or 
employment that furnishes more abundant oppor-
tunities for the ;practice of frauds upon defense-
less victims than does the profession of law. But 
it would be idle to assert that because of the fre-
quency of fraudulent practices among lawyers, 
the state could abolish the profession and forbid 
the practice of law. There is no difference in 
principle between the two cases.'' 
and in Niger v. Van Dell (1914), 85 Misc. 92, 146 N.Y.S. 
992, 144 A.L.R. 1347, a statute making it unlawful for 
officers of a club or association to solicit members as 
a measure in prevention of fraud was held discrimin-
atory and invalid. The court said: 
"It is not legitimate legislation to prohibit 
the prosecution of a lawful business or calling 
because some unscrupulous persons may, in con-
nection with it, perpetrate fraud. The thing to 
do is to prohibit and punish the fraud.'' 
(2) To protect the property owner and taxpayer 
who conducts his business upon his own private prop-
erty from competition of peddlers and hawkers. Here 
again the objection to such competition would apply to 
peddlers operating in the less congested districts, and 
there would be no reason for limiting the prohibition 
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to the business district. Furthermore, protection from 
competition is not a valid basis for such prohibition 
against peddlers and hawkers, for from time immem-
orial the streets have been used and are intended to be 
used by the public which includes peddlers and vendors 
in the conduct of their business. In the case of Good 
Humor Corporation v. New York City (1943), 290 N.Y. 
312, 49 N. E. (2d) 153, the plaintiff which engaged in 
the business of selling ice cream products from push 
·carts on the streets of New York City was granted an 
injunction restraining the enforcement of a Local Law 
prohibiting itinerant peddlers on the streets of the city. 
The Local Law had been adopted for the express pur-
pose of protecting those who pay rent and taxes from 
competition by itinerant peddlers. Mr. Justice Cardoza, 
speaking for the Court condemned the action of the 
dty in the following words: 
''Peddling merchandise upon streets and 
highways is a lawful vocation recognized and 
regulated by general statutes adopted from time 
to time by the Legislature. Though streets and 
highways are intended ;primarily for the use of 
pedestrians and vehicles travelling upon them, 
the vending of merchandise by persons who 
have no fixed place of business and who carry 
their merchandise in vehicles or on their persons 
and who seek customers from those passing. along 
the streets is a common and traditional use of the 
streets. The right to use a street by any person 
even for traveling 'must be exercised in a mode 
consistent with the equal rights of others to use 
the highway'. (People v. Rosenheimer 209 N. Y. 
115, 120). Any use of the streets, and certainly 
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an~ use of the streets for a private business pu'r-
pose, which interferes unduly with the use of the 
streets by others for travel, may doubtless be 
prohibited, in a proper case, by the legislature. 
We need not now pause to define the exact limits 
of the legislative power of a city to ado.pt local 
laws 'in relation to the care, managment and 
use of the streets'. Certainly that power is not 
broad enough to prohibit use of the street for 
a lawful business, recognized by statute, for the 
sole purpose of protecting rent payers and tax-
payers against competition from others who do 
not pay rent or taxes. The object of the Local 
Law as declared in the report of the Committee 
on general welfare is not an object which a city 
has constitutional power to make effective.'' 
He further asserted that to prohibit all street !ped-
dlers, and cause complete prohibition, where regulation 
or prohibition of only the undesirable peddlers was pos-
sible, would be unreasonable, especially where discrim-
ination would not be impracticable. This principal of 
law has been recognized in other New York cases where 
an ordinance prohibiting street sales in a certain area 
of the city was struck down as discriminatory. People 
v. Klinge, 276 N. Y. 292; see also People v. Cohen, 272 
N. Y. 319. Another city ordinance prohibiting the sale 
of ice cream was held unconstitutional because it bore 
no real and substantial relation to the health, safety or 
general welfare of the public. Schul v. King, (1946), 
(Ohio) 70 N. E. 2d 378. 
See also People v. Friedman (1940), 16 N. Y. S. 
2d 925, at 1page 929, in which the court says that ped-
dling and hawking are lawful uses of the street. 
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(3) To protect the public from the distribution of 
obscene or lewd literature. Here again the danger would 
be just as potential as a result of sales on streets out-
side of the restricted area, and therefore it cannot be 
contended that the ordinance was passed for this pur-
pose. 
( 4) To promote the general welfare by preventing 
uninvited conversation with strangers. If this is what 
the city fathers had in mind, it is difficult to under-
stand again why the prohibition is applicable only to 
the business district. In disposing of the argument that 
prohibition of solicitation from doorways of passersby 
on the sidewalk was justified under the general wel-
fare clause, as heretofore stated, the court in McKay 
Jewelers v. Bowron, supra, at page 547 of 122 Pac. 2d, 
said: 
''It is conceivable that some hypersensitive 
individuals may find this type of solicitation of-
fensive. However, that is not sufficient to justi-
fy the prohibition of an otherwise lawful method 
of conducting a business.'' 
( 5) To 1prevent congestion of traffic. By the pro-
cess of elimination, then, the conclusion must be reached 
that the principal reason for prohibiting the solicitation 
for magazine subscriptions in the business district is 
to prevent congestion of traffic. To the extent that it 
is reasonably necessary for the safety and general wel-
fare of the citizens using the streets regulation of traf-
fic is a valid exercise of the police power. However, to 
prohibit certain activities ·merely on the pretext that 
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such prohibition is for the safety and general welfare 
of the public, when, in fact, there is no reasonable re-
lation between the actiYity prohibited and the safety and 
general welfare of the public, is not a justifiable use of 
the police power, but is an unconstitutional encroachment 
upon the liberty of the persons restricted. In Pittman 
v. Nix (1943), 152 Fla. 378, 11 So. 2d 791, 144 A. L. R. 
1341, the court, in holding invalid an ordinance which 
prohibited solicitation on the streets of labor union mem-
bers, said: 
"It is impossible to conceive that this single 
act of soliciting a man on the street, or in a .public 
park for that matter, to join a labor union and 
pay a membership fee therein, could in any way 
prevent the free use of the street, the sidewalks 
or any other public place in the city by the gene-
ral public. And in considering the validity of 
ordinances of this general nature, we must not 
forget that the liberty guaranteed to us by Sec-
tion 13 of our Declaration of Rights includes 
freedom of speech and of the press.'' 
The United States Supreme Court, as stated above, 
In its recent decision in Schneider v. State, supra, in 
striking down municipal ordinances of four different 
American cities had the following to say about a ''hand-
bill'' ordinance adopted for the purpose of keeping the 
streets clean : 
"As we have pointed out the public con-
venience in respect of cleanliness of the streets 
does not justify an exertion of the police power 
which invades the free communication of infor-
mation and opinion secured by the constitution.'' 
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For the same reason the city of Salt Lake shouldn't 
prohibit a lawful activity, that of soliciting magazine 
subscriptions, merely for the public convenience of hav-
ing free flow of traffic. Smooth flow of traffic may 
be obtained by an ordinance prohibiting the actual stop-
1ping and blocking of numbers of persons on the side-
walks, but not by an ordinance prohibiting a lawful 
activity because it might tend to block traffic in iso-
lated cases. 
Paragraph 1 of Section 3652 of the Ordinances 
makes it unlawful to offer for sale, without obtaining 
a license, any tickets, coupons or receipts representing 
value, or redeemable in service, photographs, works of 
art, and magazine subscriptions in addition to goods, 
wares and merchandise. Paragraph 2 then provides that 
goods, wares and merchandise, and magazine subscrip-
tions shall not be sold under any circumstances in the 
business district. The apparent intention of the board 
of commissioners in adopting such ordinance being to 
differentiate between magazine subscriptions and those 
other items which are not goods, wares and merchan-
dise. In other words, . if the phrase ''goods, wares and 
merchandise'' is not intended to include !photographs, 
works of art, tickets, coupons or receipts representing 
value or redeemable in service, and magazine subscrip-
tions, then all of those things may be sold in the busi-
ness district except magazine subscriptions. Regarding 
the sales of newspapers there is no problem of inter-
pretation because Section 364 7 in defining hawkers spe-
cifically exempts those who sell newspapers. Paragraph 
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12 of Section 3652 states that the provisions of said 
section shall not apply to persons peddling butter, eggs, 
fruit, Yegetables or poultry raised or produced by them-
selves so long as they register in the office of the license 
assessor in Salt Lake City. Therefore upon careful 
reading of the above sections of the ordinance it is dis-
covered that when properly licensed or registered the 
following activities may be carried on in the business 
district: sale of newspapers, photographs, work of art, 
tickets, coupons and receipts representing value, or re-
deemable in service, and farm produce raised or pro-
duced by the person selling; while on the other hand 
the following activities, even though licensed, may not 
be carried on in the business district : sale of magazine 
subscriptions, goods, wares, merchandise and farm 
iproducts not produced or raised by the seller. This 
interpretation is based upon the premise that ''goods, 
wares and merchandise'' as used in paragraph 2 of 
Section 3652 does not include tickets, coupons, receipts, 
etc. 
Definitions in Webster's New International Dic-
tionary, Second Edition, are as follows: 
Goods: wares; commodities; chattels; in the 
English Sale of Goods Act (56 & 57 Viet. c. 71 ; 
(1893) goods include all chattels personal other 
than things in action and money. 
Wares : articles of merchandise ; the sum of 
articles of a particular kind or class ; style or class 
of manufactures; goods; commodities; merchan-
dise. 
Merchandise: the objects of commerce, what-
ever is usually bought or sold in trade; goods; 
wares. 
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In the hearing below on the demurrer it was stip-
ulated that the Board of Commissioners granted per-
mission to street photographers to carry on their busi-
ness on the ground that they were not selling goods, 
wares or merchandise, but rather were selling a service 
not included in the prohibition of the ordinance, there-
by indicating the meaning which said Board of Commis-
sioners intended to give the words ''goods, wares and 
merchandise.'' If the sale of a coupon entitling one 
to a photograph is a service, then so also is the sale of 
a ticket entitling one to a sightseeing tour, and the sale 
of a magazine subscriiption services and they should all 
be classified together, and distinct from ''goods, wares 
and merchandise.'' 
Section 81-6-5, Utah Code Annotated, and the Uni-
form Sales Act define the word ''goods'' as follows: 
''Goods'' includes all chattels personal, other 
than things in action and money. The term in-
cludes emblements, industrial growing crops, and 
things attached to or forming part of the land 
which are agreed to be severed before sale or 
under the contract of sale.'' 
Section 3661, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
1944, defines a merchandise broker as one who 
''engages in the business of buying, selling 
or negotiating for the purchase or sale of meats, 
provisions, produce, hay, grain, flour, goods, lum-
ber, wares, merchandise, drugs, medicines, jewel-
ry or precious metals.'' 
There is no positive statement in any of the defi-
nitions above quoted that brings these coupons, tickets, 
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receipts, magazine subscriptions, etc., within the mean-
ing of the words ''goods, wares and merchandise.'' In 
People Y. Finkelstein, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 941, the defendant 
who had been arrested for selling on the street a pam-
phlet entitled ''John L. Lewis Exposed,'' was convicted 
of violating an ordinance prohibiting the sale of mer-
chandise on the street without a license. The ordinance 
specifically exempted newspapers and magazines from 
the prohibition. The reviewing court in reversing the 
judgment of conviction held that the pamphlets, as well 
as newspapers and magazines, were not included in the 
term, ''merchandise.'' 
If, then, the court is convinced that tickets, coupons, 
receipts, etc., are not within the meaning of the words 
"goods, wares and merchandise," and that the ordi-
nance makes no prohibition against selling them on the 
streets of the business district, while it expressly ex-
cludes the sale of orders for magazine subscriptions, 
then there is unreasonable discrimination. As regards 
the sale of newspapers, the board of commissioners has 
clearly differentiated that activity from that of selling 
magazine subscriptions. So far as the purpose of re-
lieving the sidewalks of traffic congestion is concerned, 
is there any reasonable basis for such differentiation~ 
For purposes of classifying mail matter, newspapers and 
other periodical publications which are issued at stated 
intervals are classified together as second class mail. 
Federal Code Annotated, Vol. 9A, Title 39, Section 224. 
The National Encyclo1pedia defines "newspaper" as 
''A publication containing chiefly news of 
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current events, feature articles and advertising, ill 
and issued at fixed periods." 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines newspapers as D 
''Papers conveying news, printed and dis-
tributed periodically.'' ~i 
The State of Utah has classified editors of news- re: 
papers and editors of periodicals together in Section 
48:0-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, in listing those w 
exempt from jury service. And in regulating the hours l: 
during which children may perform any work, Section 
14-6-16 provides that boys over the age of 10 years 
may engage in the distribution of newspapers, maga-
zines, periodicals or hand bills on fixed routes in resi-
dential districts, thereby indicating the policy of the 
state legislature in classification of newspapers and 
magazines together in the matter of distribution. Fur-
thermore, in Section 42-3-2 newspapers and periodicals 
are classed together in listing the industries required 
to be reported upon by the department of publicity and 
industrial development to the governor. Also Section 
103-38-11 states: 
''Any .person who willfully states, conveys, 
delivers or transmits, by any means whatsoever, 
to the manager, editor, publisher or reporter of 
any newspaper, magazine, periodical or serial for 
publication therein, any false or libelous state-
ment concerning any person, and thereby secures 
actual publication of the same, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor." 
again indicating the intention of the legislature of the 
State of Utah to classify magazines with newspapers, 
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all of which indicates that Salt Lake City has gone be-
yond its constitutional powers in discrin1inating between 
the sale of newspapers and magazine subscriptions. 
Appellants allege and respondents by demurring 
admit that appellant and his agents, employees and rep-
resentatives conducted their business on the streets 
in a very orderly, quiet manner. The question of mag-
azine stands or racks on the sidewalks is not involved. 
As a general rule the salesman approaches just one 
person at a time and invites a converS'ation. If the 
prospective customer indicates that he doesn't wish to 
stop for a conversation, the solicitor thanks him and 
presses the matter no further. If the person stops and 
indicates a willingness to talk to the salesman the latter 
suggests that they step back off the middle of the side-
walk, either against the buildings or at the curb be-
tween the parking meters in order to keep the way clear 
for the pedestrian traffic. The conversation is a direct 
solicitation for a magazine subscription and either a 
sale is made or the :person solicited goes on his way. 
This harmless activity, according to the ordinance, is 
unlawful in the business district of Salt Lake City. In 
comparison, consider the newsboy of whose methods 
judicial knowledge may be taken. He shouts the head-
lines, and thrusts his paper in front of passersby, and 
oftentimes joins one or two others in ganging up on 
the same customer at the same time; and yet it is 
perfectly legal for him to do so. The methods of the 
magazine salesman are more similar to those of the 
salesmen of tickets for sightseeing tours. The latter 
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approaches the prospective customer and trys to talk 
him into purchasing a ticket for one or many of the 
various tours provided by his company. Many times a 
rather long conversation takes place, and there is just 
as much tendency, if any, to block the traffic on the 
sidewalk as there is by the magazine salesman. And, 
compared with the street !photographer, sofar as block-
ing traffic is concerned, there is not as much danger 
of it from selling a magazine subscription as from the 
activities of the street photographer who stands in the 
middle of thesidewalk to snap a picture and who stops 
his customer for the purpose of selling him a coupon 
entitling him to receive the picture when it is devel-
oped. Yet the ordinance doesn't prohibit this activity 
for the reason that it isn't the sale of "goods, wares 
and merchandise.'' All these activities are permitted, 
but when it comes to the magazine salesman, the ordi-
dance makes his soliciting upon the streets a criminal 
offense. There is no reasonable basis for such discrim-
ination. 
The City of Los Angeles atteiil.lpted by a special 
ordinance to prohibit photographers from conducting 
their business on the streets of the city. The ordinance 
made it unlawful to sell any coupon, tickets, receipt or 
matter relating to a photograph taken of passersby on 
the street. The court in Portnoy v. Hohman (1942), 50 
Cal. App. 2d 22, 122 Pac. 2d 533, struck down the ordi-
nance as being discriminitory against street photog-
raphers in favor of those selling any other kind of 
tickets, such as tickets to ball games, theaters, shows, 
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and the distribution of handbills pertaining to these 
things. The court said at page 534 of 122 Pac. 2d: 
"Upon its face the ordinance sets up an ar-
bitrary and unreasonable classification of per-
sons soliciting sales and distributing advertis-
ing matter upon the public streets, not based up-
on any natural or constitutional difference, and 
therefore violates the constitutional guaranties 
of equal protection of the law against depriva-
tion of .property without due process of law." 
Not far afield is the case of Eden vs. People, 161 
lli. 296, 43 N. E. 1108, involving a Sunday closing ordi-
nance requiring all barber shops to close their doors 
to business on Sunday. The court in striking the ordi-
nance down as discriminatory and a violation of the due 
process clause of the Constitution said at page 309 of 
161 Ill.: 
"If the public welfare of the state demands 
that all business and all labor of every descrip-
tion, except works of necessity and charity, 
should cease on Sunday, the first day of the 
week, and that day should be kept as a day of 
rest, the legislature has the power to enact a law 
requiring all persons· to refrain from their ordi-
nary callings that day. (Cooley's Const. Lim. 
725) All will then be placed on a perfect equality, 
and no one can complain of an unjust discrimina-
tion. But when the legislature undertakes to 
single out one class of labor harmless in itself, 
and condemns that and that alone, it transcends 
its legitimate powers, and its action cannot be 
sustained.'' 
The recent case of Gronlund v. Salt Lake City 
(1948) __ Utah--, 194 Pac. 2d 464, decided by the 
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Utah Supreme Court held a similar Sunday closing 
ordinance discriminatory and invalid because it at-
tempted to differentiate between the sale of different 
classes of goods as being more of an emergency type 
than others, or more necessary to the sustenance of 
life. The court pointed out how ridiculous it was to 
say that smoking tobacco was necessary and butter was 
not. In principle the basis for differentiation between 
selling magazine subscriptions and selling newspapers, 
tickets, coupons and receipts is just as unreasonable as 
the distinctions attempted in the Sunday closing ordi-
nance. 
Appellant admits that the use of the street or side-
walk for business purposes is subordinate to the use of 
the general public for travel. Many cases hold that 
ordinances :prohibiting the placing of goods, wares and 
merchandise on the sidewalks, or the placing of a stand, 
or the stopping of a wagon or push cart for the pur-
pose of displaying goods, wares, or merchandise are 
valid as applied to activities that in fact block the traf-
fic in any way. See Com. v. Ellis (1893), 158 Mass. 555, 
33 N. E. 651 (concerning a stationary object) ; State v. 
Messonlongitis (1898) 74 Minn. 165, 77 N. W. 29 (pro-
hibiting the exposing of goods on the sidewalks an 
unreasonable time) ; Shelton v. Mobile (1857) 30 Ala. 
540, 68 Am. Dec. 143 (prohibiting the sale of poultry, 
meat, fish and game); Denver v. Girard' (1895), 21 Colo. 
447, 42 Pac. 662 (regarding a stand on the street); and 
House Wives League v. Indianapolis (1933), 204 Ind. 
685, 185 N. E. 511 (pertaining to stands for the sale 
of IP·roduce and other articles). 
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In State v. Barbelais (1906), 101 Me. 512, 64 Atl. 
881, the court in sustaining an ordinance requiring a 
permit to carry on a trade or business in a public street, 
said: 
"It did not mean that one person could not 
make a sale of any article to another person on 
the street, as a result of private negotiation, but 
that it did mean that a person should not offer 
articles fou sale to the public in a public manner, 
either from a permanent stand or from a cart 
pushed or driven along the street.'' 
Likewise, in People v. Dmytro (1937), 280 Mich. 82, 
273 N. W. 40, 111 A. L. R. 128, the court upheld an ordi-
nance prohibiitng ''curb service,'' but recognized the 
right of peddlers and hawkers to sell their wares, be-
cause they keep moving along the street, and don't stop 
in one place and congest traffic. Appellant suggests 
that the case of Chicago v. Rhine, supra, relied upon 
by the respondents, is in the same class as the last above 
cited cases. It appears from the statement of facts in 
the report of the court's opinion_ that the defendant was 
charged with "exposing for sale, magazines in front 
of 22 South Clark Street," indicating that the case in-
volved a stand, cart, or something of a permanent, phy-
sical nature from or upon which the defendant was 
displaying and selling his magazines. 
Appellant also attacks the ordinance in question on 
the ground that it completely prohibits the use of the 
streets in the business district by solicitors for maga-
zine subscriptions, when the general statutory law from 
which the city derives its power merely grants the power 
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to regulate. Section 15-8-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
/provides as follows: 
''They (Board of Commissioners) may regu-
late merchandising and sales upon the streets, 
side walks and public places.'' 
The power to regulate does not included the power to 
prohibit. So held the Supreme Court of the State of 
Florida in Quigg v. State (1922), 93 So. 139, 84 Fla. 
164, in striking down an ordinance which prohibited 
jitneys on certain streets where the statute gave the 
city power to regulate only; the court said: 
''Nor does the welfare clause authorize a 
prohibition of use when such vehicles are not 
shown to be inherently dangerous to those who 
travel the streets. Curry v. Osborn, 76 Fla. 39, 
79 So. 293, 6 A.L.R. 108. If they are dangerously 
operated, that can be remedied by proper regu-
lations, even to the extent of exclusion from use 
of the streets for not observing permissible regu-
lations, that may be enforced in the interest of 
public safety and convenience.'' 
In Chicago v. Schultz (1930), 341 Ill 208, 173 N. E. 
276, the City of Chicago had passed an ordinance pro-
hibiting the distribution or handing out of handbills, 
cards, pictures or advertising matter upon the public 
streets. The grants of power to the city hy the state 
legislature included the power to regulate the use of its 
streets generally, and specifically to prohibit the throw-
ing of offensive matter in the streets, the !POsting of 
handbills upon the streets, and the exhibition or carry-
ing of handbills upon the sidewalks. The defendant was 
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convicted of distributing handbills, and the reviewing 
court in reversing the judgment held that the specific 
power to prohibit distribution of handbills vvas not in-
cluded in the statutory grants. The court at page 277 
of 173 N. E. said: 
''Therefore if the city has authority to pass 
such an ordinance it must be under its power to 
regulate streets (clause 9) or under its general 
police powers delegated by clause 66, and it must 
be a reasonable regulation tending in some degree 
toward the prevention of offenses or preserva-
tion of .public health, morals, safety or welfare .. 
. . Statutes granting power to municipal corpora-
tions are strictly construed, and any fair and 
reasonable doubt as to the existance of the 
powers must be resolved against the munici-
pality ... Although this power of regulation has 
been conferred upon the city council, the legis-
lature has not specified the precise manner in 
which it shall be exercised, and therefore the 
reasonableness of the exercise of the power by 
the council is open to inquiry by the courts.'' 
Then the court points out that the ordinance is so 
broad that it would prohibit the handing by a person 
of his card or picture to another and would even prevent 
the sale or distribution of newspapers because they 
contained advertising matter. In condemning this type 
of prohibition the court said further: 
"Laws which attempt to regulate and restain 
our conduct in matters of mere indifference, 
, without any good end in view, are regulations 
destructive of liberty . . . . . The ordinance is not 
a reasonable exercise of its police powers. Its 
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strict enforcement would unreasonably hamper 
persons in the conduct of their affairs.'' 
Should the prohibition in the case at bar be con-
sidered to be a regulation pursuant to the Utah statute 
quoted above, it is still subject to the requirement that 
it be reasonable. In discussing the power of a city to 
restrict hacks, etc., to certain parts of the city, Tied-
man on Limitation of the Police Power at page 312 says: 
"But the prohibition as to locality must be 
reasonable, in order that it may not offend the 
constitutional limitations. If the area in which 
the prosecution of a useful trade is prohibited 
is so extensive that it amounts to a practical pro-
hibition of the trade the regulations will be un-
constitutional.'' 
It is submitted that even though Section 3652 per-
mits solicitation of magazine subscriptions in some parts 
of the city, it is still unreasonable since it prohibits 
the activity in the only part of the city where it can 
be carried on profitably, and, therefore, it practically 
amounts to a complete prohibition of the trade. 
IV. Assuming that Section 3652, Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City 1944, is valid on its face, then the dis-
criminatory enforcement of the ordinance is unlawful and 
should be enjoined. 
Under this point appellant, for the sake of argu-
ment, assumes that Section 3647, exempting newsboys 
from that class known . as peddlers and hawkers, is a 
valid classification, and that the prohibition of Section 
3652 is valid on its face in that it applys to any kind 
of sale whatsoever in the business district, and that the 
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phrase ''goods, wares and merchandise,'' includes tick-
ets, coupons, receipts, etc. The section then would place 
a flat prohibition against any sales whatsoever on the 
streets of the business district except the sale of news-
papers. 
The complaint alleges that in spite of the existence 
of Section 3652 and the fact that the resiPondents have 
enforced it against appellants and his agents, employees 
and representatives, the respondents have consistently 
permitted the activities of others in the same class to 
sell tickets, coupons, receipts and pamphlets on the 
streets of Salt Lake City's business district. It was 
admitted below by the respondents in the hearing on 
the demurrer that salesmen for local transportation com-
panies without interference by the police or local au-
thorities sell on the busiest corners of the business dis-
trict tickets or coupons to tourists entitling them to 
sightseeing tours of the city or surrounding points of 
interest. By sti;pulation, as noted above, it was also 
established that the board of commissioners by written 
permission has attempted to waive the prohibition of 
the section in the case of street photographers so as 
to permit them to sell coupons entitling the purchasers 
thereof to photographs taken by the photographers 
right in the middle of the sidewalk; and that the local 
police to not enforce the ordinance against them; yet 
there is absolutely no provision in the ordinances where-
by the Board of Commissioners reserved to themselves 
the right to waive the restriction in favor of anyone 
other than owners of abutting property, and these jpho-
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tographers do not come within that class. Appellant 
alleges further that certain persons who call themselves 
''Jehovah's Witnesses'' sell a magazine known as the 
"Watchtower" on the streets of the business district 
without any interference by the police of local authori-
ties. In addition to these activities the court below took 
judicial notice of the fact that there have been at various 
times ticket offices or stands erected on the streets of 
the business district where tickets to rodeos and shows 
have been sold to the passing public, also without any 
intereference by the police or respondents. Further-
more appellant now asks this court to take judicial no-
tice of the fact that during the summer months ice 
cream vendors have with impunity pushed carts up 
and down the streets of the business district, sto\I)ped 
them temporarily and sold ice cream to passersby. It 
is also common knowledge that for many years such 
service organizations as the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 
and Disabled Veterans have sold ''poppies'' through 
volunteer agents on the streets of the business district 
with nothing but encouragement from local authorities 
and respondents. Yet for some reason unknown to this 
appellant as soon as he or his agents, employees and 
representatives proceeded to sell magazine subscriptions 
on the sidewalks of the business district respondents 
saw to it that they were stopped by arresting them and 
charging them with the violation of Section 3652. Such 
is a flagrant discrimination in the enforcement of the 
ordinance. 
The decision of the lower court in sustaining the 
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den1urrer and dismissing appellant's complaint asking 
for a permanent injunction restraining such discrimin-
atory enforcement was that the failure of police offi-
cers to apprehend and prosecute one thief is not avail-
able as a defense to a prosecution against another thief 
that was apprehended and prosecuted. Appellant agrees 
that such failure is no defense to a criminal prosecution, 
but contends that that is no argument against the 
granting of injunctive relief where there is a clear 
intentional discrimination on the part of public officials 
in the enforcement of a criminal ordinance. In support 
of appellant's contention several cases are hereinafter 
cited and quoted. 
"'\Vade v. City and County of San Francisco (1947), 
-- Cal. App. --, 186 Pac. 2d 181, a case practically 
identical with the one at bar, was recently decided by 
the California court of appeals. San Francisco had 
adopted an ordinance prohibiting solicitation for the 
sale of any magazine or periodical for future delivery, 
or the sale of any tangible personal property to be 
delivered to the purchaser thereof at a subsequent time. 
Plaintiff, a solicitor for magazine subscriptions, sought 
an injunction against the discriminatory enforcement 
of the ordinance. He alleged that others with im;punity 
were violating the ordinance, and that the police and 
city officials had knowledge of such violations. The 
appellate court in reversing the lower court's decision 
sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, at page 182 of 
186, Pac. 2d, said: 
''The plaintiffs by these allegations bring 
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their case within the principle first announced 
in Yick W o. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 156, 6 S. Ct. 
1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, and recently followed by the 
Supreme Court of this state in Brock v. Superior 
Court, 12 Cal. 2d 605, 610, 86 P. 2d 805. The 
latest statement of that principle that has come 
to our attention is found in Glicker v. Michigan 
Liquor Control Commission, 6 Cir., 160 F. 2d 
96. The court in that case reviewed the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court on the sub-
ject and reiterated the rule that the intentional 
and arbitrary discrimination in the enforcement 
of a statute fair on its face is a violation of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States 
which entitles the person discriminated against 
to relief in the courts. 
''Respondents argue that mere lax enforce-
ment of a law or ordinance violates no consti-
tutional rights, This is a correct statement of 
the law, but appellants allege more than mere 
laxity of enforcement. They plead that the ordi-
nance is enforced against them and no others 
'with intent to discriminate against plaintiffs and 
plaintiffs' said business.' This brings them 
squarely within the rule announced in Glicker 
v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission supra; 
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 11, 64 S. Ct. 397, 
88 L. Ed. 497; and Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. 
Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352, 38 
S. Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154. In each of those cases 
the distinction between mere laxity of enforce-
ment and intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion is recognized and it is held that while mere 
laxity of enforcement, although it may result in 
the unequal application of the law to those who 
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of 
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equal protection in the constitutional sense, it 
is otherwise in the case of deliberate or inten-
tional discriminatory enforcement which is a de-
nial of the equal protection guaranteed by the 
constitution. \Yhile we are fully aware that proof 
frequently falls short of .pleading appellants by 
their pleading have stated a cause of action which 
if proved will entitle them to relief and for the 
purpose of this appeal respondents by their de-
murrer have admitted the truth of the pleaded 
facts.'' 
As appears from the above quotation the Wade 
case cited and followed the case of Yick W o v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220, which, 
arose out of an ordinance in the City of San Francisco 
prohibiting the further use of frame buildings for 
steam laundries, except in cases where the board of 
commissioners granted a special permit. Petitioners and 
all other Chinese laundry operators were denied per-
mits, while the commissioners consistently granted per-
mits to those operators of the caucasian race. The 
court at (page 373 of 118 U. S. in directing the lower 
court to discharge the prisoners who had been arrested 
for violation of the ordinance, denounced the discrim-
inatory enforcement as follows: 
"Though the law itself be fair on its face 
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied 
and administered by public authority with an 
evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically 
to make unjust and illegal discriminations be-
tween persons in similar circumstances, material 
to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still 
within the .prohibition of the constitution .... The 
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discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the 
public administration which enforces it is a de-
nial of the equal protection of the laws and a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitio-
ners is, therefore, illegal, and they must be dis-
charged.'' 
In Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission 
(1947), 6 Cir., 160 Fed. 2d 96, also cited by the Wade 
case the court held that the plaintiff who had been con-
sistantly discriminated against by the liquor commis-
sion in revoking her license to sell liquor was entitled 
to an order directing the defendant commission to renew 
her license. 
In the case of Hague v. C. I. 0., supra, Jersey 
City had adopted an ordina·nce requiring anyone who 
intended to conduct a public meeting in any public place 
in the city to register with the director of public safety 
and obtain a permit so to do from him. Rep·resentatives 
of the plaintiff organization applied for a permit which 
was denied, while those who championed causes dear to 
the hearts of the city fathers were granted permits. 
Plaintiff was granted an injunction which enjoined the 
defendants from abridging ;plaintiff's right to hold 
meetings unless defendants should refuse everybody such 
right. The appellate court, in affirming, modified the 
decree so as to enjoin the defendants from refusing to 
the plaintiff the right to hold meetings regardless of 
whether or not others were forbidden. 
The lower court in the case at bar in its memor-
andum decision held that these cases of discrimination 
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in the granting and withholding of permits by adminis-
trative bodies or officers are not binding on the court 
in this case, because here the question of discretion of 
some such body or officer is not involved and it is merely 
a question of failure on the part of the police officers 
of the respondent city to enforce a flat prohibition 
equally against all violators. Appellant admits there is 
a technical difference between discrimination _on the 
part of an administrative officer who has been given 
discretion within limits, and discriminati<:>n by a police 
officer who has no discretion but is by law supposed to 
enforce the law against everybody equally. However, 
as a practical matter the result is the same. Appellant 
is in just the same disadvantageous position as if the 
chief of police had the power by the ordinance to grant 
or withhold permits and Without sufficient reason dis-
criminated against appellant by refusing to grant him 
a permit. Appellant insists as did the court in the Wade 
case that an intentional and purposeful discrimination 
as distinguished from mere laxity of enforcement is a 
denial of equal protection guaranteed· by the Constiti-
tution. 
The Wade ·case ·is not alinie. It is supported by the 
case of Covington v. Gausepohl (1933), 250 Ky. 323, 
62 S. W. 2d 1040. The City of Covington had adopted 
an ordinance prohibiting the placing ·of boxes, barrels, 
baskets or merchandise upon the sidewalks of the city. 
The city enforced the ordinance againsf the plaintiff 
and other storekeepers but allowed hucksters and farm-
ers to place with impunity their goods, wares and mer-
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chandise on the sidewalks while soliciting trade. Upon 
suit brought by the plaintiff storkeeper the lower court 
issued an order perpetually enjoining the enforcement 
of the ordinance. Upon appeal by the city, the appel-
late court, in sustaining the lower court's decision, mod-
ified the injunction as follows : 
"Instead of enjoing all enforcement of the 
ordinance involved, the court should only have 
enjoined the city from making discriminations 
in its enforcement, and this injunction is now 
so modified and the judgment is affirmed.'' 
As appears in the opinion the Kentucky court also relies 
on the Yick Wo case and after quoting a part of the 
opinion quoted above, said: 
''The city would be commended for its ef-
forts to keep its sidewalks clear of obstruction if 
it acted impartially, but it cannot be allowed to 
discriminate. " 
Other cases, though not entirely in point, announc-
ing the same general principle that a law enforced in 
such a way as to affect a discrimination against a part 
of the community or public is unlawful even though 
fair on its face, are Dobbins v. Los Angeles (1904), 49 
L. Ed. 169, 195 U. S. 233, 25 S. Ct. 18; Clark v. City of 
Burlington, 101 Vt. 391, 143 Atl. 677; cited by McMillan 
on Municipal Corporations, Vol. 2, page 939, note 1; 
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bosworth ( 1915), 230 Fed. 
191, at page 206; and Walker v. City of Birmingham 
(1927), 112 So. 823, 216 Ala. 206. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in sustaining the general de-
murrer, and respondents should be required to disprove 
the allegations of the complaint or else be directed to 
cease interfering "ith appellant, his agents, representa-
tives and employees and their business. 
The action of the respondents in arresting and 
threatening to arrest appellant, his agents, representa-
tives and employees is unlawful in that it is in deroga-
tion of their rights of freedom of s:p·eech and freedom of 
the press, and also for the reason that it is an inter-
ference with the free flow of interstate commerce. 
Section 3652 of the Ordinances which prohibits appel-
lant's activities in the business district is unconstitu-
tional for the same reasons. Section 3652 especially when 
read together with Section 3647 exempting newsboys, is 
also invalid for the reason that it makes an unreasonable 
discrimination against magazine subscription solicitors 
in favor of salesmen of newspapers and all other types 
of tickets, coupons, and receipts. And should the Court 
hold that Section 3652 is intended to apply to the sale 
of all types of tickets, coupons and recei;pts as well as 
to the solicitation of magazine subscriptions, then al-
though the section is fair on its face, the intentional 
and purposeful discrimination in the enforcement of 
said section against appellant and his magazine sales-
men in favor of salesmen of "Watchtower," tickets for 
sightseeing tours, photograph coupons, receipts, ice 
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cream, "poppies "and rodeo tickets is unlawful and 
should be enjoined. The case should be remanded for 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. RICHARDS and 
T. QUENTIN CANNON, 
.Attorneys for .AlJ1pellant. 
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